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1. Introduction and Research Question 
 
On December 2, 2016, the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and the president-elect of the United 
States, Donald Trump, spoke on the phone (Trump-Tsai phone call). President Tsai congratulated Trump 
on winning the elections in the United States. This phone call had major political implications; official 
contact between the president of the US and the president of Taiwan, formally known as the Republic 
of China (ROC), had not occurred since 1979 (Philips, 2016). Since 1979, the U.S. federal government 
has adhered to the One-China policy, which states that the Taiwanese island is officially part of mainland 
China. In 1979, the U.S. federal government fully recognised the government of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China and cut off diplomatic ties with the ROC (Chen, 
2017, 886). Trump was only the president-elect of the US at the time of the phone call, and it was unclear 
whether this phone call indicated a formal shift in U.S. relations with the PRC and the ROC. Still, the 
phone call seemed to stir up Sino-U.S. and cross-strait relations (the relationship between mainland 
China and the island of Taiwan) (Chen, 2017, 886). 
The One-China policy is an essential part of China’s international relations. It states that there 
is only one China, which includes both mainland China and Taiwan and that the government of the PRC 
is the sole legitimate government of China. The One-China policy is embedded in the preamble of the 
constitution and in the anti-secession law of the PRC. Many countries in the world who have diplomatic 
ties with the PRC are required to adhere to the One-China policy. This phone call suggested a possible 
attempt by the US to undermine the One-China policy. Furthermore, a tweet posted by Trump after the 
phone call strongly suggested that his administration would no longer adhere to the One-China policy 
and that he intended to move closer to Taiwan1. On February 9, 2017, Trump spoke by telephone with 
the president of China, Xi Jinping, and affirmed that his administration would continue to honour the 
One-China policy (Chen, 2017, 887).  
The Trump-Tsai phone call drew a lot of media attention, not only in the US and China; media 
from all over the world reported on the call. The amount of media attention generated by one phone call 
aroused my interest in this topic. I wondered if this phone call really did stir up Sino-U.S. and cross-
strait relations. Would the PRC take any countermeasures and if so, what kind? What was the discourse 
within the PRC concerning Sino-U.S. and cross-strait relations? These questions ran through my mind 
when I read reports on the Trump-Tsai phone call.  
I am especially interested in the reaction of the PRC to this phone call. One political party leads 
the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, the Party). In 1949, the CCP came to power, and to this 
day it has been the only ruling party in the PRC. The top party leadership of the CCP is generally also 
                                                 
1On December 2, 2016, Donald Trump sent a  tweet that read ‘@therealdonaldtrump: The President of Ta iwan CALLED ME 
today to wish me congratulations on winning the Presidency. Thank you!’ On December 3, 2016, Trump sent another tweet 
that read ‘@therealdonaldtrump: Interesting how the US sells Taiwan billions of dollars of military equipment but I  should 
not accept a congratulatory ca ll’. 
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the government leadership of the PRC.2 However, this does not imply that the CCP is the PRC and that 
the CCP will remain in power indefinitely (Shambaugh, 2008, 1-11). I want to examine how the Chinese 
state reacted to this phone call and whether the phone call has made a significant difference to how the 
Chinese state views Taiwan and cross-strait relations. Moreover, I am interested in how this discourse 
relates to the national identity of China, how the CCP constructs Chinese national identity, and whether 
this has changed since the Trump-Tsai phone call. Since the CCP is the ruling party of the PRC, it makes 
sense to investigate the reactions of CCP officials. While it is challenging to figure out what is going on 
inside the head of the leaders of the CCP, examining the state media may shed some light on how the 
CCP interpreted and dealt with the phone call. Stated-owned media publications in China rarely disagree 
with, or deviate far from, the party line, so it is useful to analyse these publications (Stockmann, 2013, 
67). Therefore, I decided on the following research question: To what extent has the phone call from the 
president of the Republic of China (ROC), Tsai Ing-wen, to the president–elect of the United States, 
Donald Trump, changed the discourse of the official Chinese state media on cross-strait relations, and 
how does this relate to the construction of China’s national identity? 
 I begin with a review of the literature on the discourse approach to studying national identity 
within the discipline of international relations (IR)3. Hence, I explain the triangular relationship between 
the US, China, and Taiwan. I then introduce my methodology and research materials. Subsequently, I 
present my research findings, which I link to my literature review. Finally, I draw a conclusion and 
answer my research question.   
In my analysis, I mainly focus on three discourse topics and discursive strategies (intertextuality, 
language and pictures) of newspaper articles.  In both parts, I look at how different identity manoeuvres 
construct a notion of China’s national identity. Analysing the different articles showed me that this 
phone call was an unexpected and an unacceptable event for the PRC. The discourse regarding China’s 
military power occurs quite strong in the period after the phone call. With regard to the construction of 
national identity, I conclude that the newspaper articles construct an identity of China which is 
‘unassailable’ for any changes from external actors in Sino-U.S. or cross-strait relations. The l position 
of Taiwan in China’s identity is constructed in a conflicting way by the articles I analysed. Language 
features often identify Taiwan as the ‘other’, which excludes Taiwan from China’s identity. However, 
when speaking about Sino-U.S. relations, Taiwan is included in China’s identity.  
 
 
                                                 
2 In the PRC, top leaders of the government also hold a high party (CCP) rank. Top government and party organs are both 
housed in the same building. Besides, funds for running the Party come directly from the government. Therefore, the top 
authorities appear to unite in one command structure (Lieberthal, 1988, 40).  
3 The discipline of International Relations (IR) refers to the interdisciplinary academic field of which s tudies the relationships 
between political entities, which s tarted focussing on sovereign states. Nowadays scholars often use the following definition: 
“International Relations is a  science which is concerned with relations among nations, and other issues l ike non-state actors, 
international pol itical economy, international security, foreign pol icies of major powers, globalization, international 
terrorism, international environment, and area s tudies” (Aneek, 2010, 5). 
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2. The Discourse Approach to Studying National Identity within the 
Discipline of International Relations  
 
In this thesis, I examine how the official Chinese state media portrayed the Trump-Tsai phone call and 
how this relates to ‘reality’. My literature review focusses on the use of discourse analysis and the study 
of national identity within the discipline of IR. I begin with a short introduction to the discourse approach 
and the focus on texts. Second, I explain how discourse studies have developed within the discipline of 
IR. Third, I examine the use of discourse in the study of national identity. Finally, I examine cross-strait 
issues and explain the relevance of this case study.  
 
2.1.Discourse and the Focus on Texts  
 
The concept of ‘discourse’ began with Michael Foucault, who critically re-examined the production of 
knowledge under specific historical circumstances and within specific cultural contexts. Since the 
1970s, the term ‘discourse’ has been adopted in research across the humanities, the social sciences and 
linguistics (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, 7). Discourse studies investigate the relationship between form and 
function in verbal communication (Renkema, 2004, 1). Discourse can mean anything from an historical 
moment, text or speech to language in general. The value of studying discourse has been questioned 
from scholars in the disciplines of social science, political science, anthropology, history, and more, due 
to the often vague descriptions of what it actually is (Wodak & Meyer 2009, 1). The core of a discourse 
is a ‘text’, which may be written or spoken, and discourse analysis can help us to understand the political 
meaning and context of a particular text (Schneider, 2013). Teun Van Dijk offers a very precise 
definition of discourse analysis, which emphasises the core of this approach: ‘A discourse analysis is 
the systematic and explicit analysis of the various structures and strategies of different levels of text and 
talk’ (Van Dijk, 2007, 5).  
 
2.2. Discourse Studies within the Discipline of International Relations  
 
Examining the concept of discourse within the discipline of IR, we can conclude that no common 
understanding has emerged with regard to the best method of studying discourse (Milliken, 1999, 226). 
Traditional approaches4 to international politics do not attribute importance to the role of language and 
texts. Realist and neorealist scholars prefer to explain IR behaviour using the concept of hard power5 
(Addler, 1997, 321).  
                                                 
4 With ‘traditional approaches’ in International Relations, I  refer to realism and l iberalism, as well as to update theories of 
these, so neo-realism, neo-liberalism and the English School (Garner, Ferdinand, & Lawson, 2016, 342). Neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism have arisen from realism and l iberalism; the original approaches adapted themselves to popular debates in 
the 1980s  (Overbeek, 2002, 2-7) 
5 In international politics, hard power refers to the capacity of enforcement to influence another to act in a way in which 
the other would not have acted otherwise (Wilson, 2008, 114).  
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The Third Debate, which emerged in the late eighties and initiated a constructivist turn6 , 
challenged traditional IR approaches, such as realism and neorealism, by emphasising the importance 
of language and communication in IR. Traditional IR models could not predict the fall of the Soviet 
Union and lacked a ‘social’ aspect. The Third Debate made way for a ‘linguistic turn’ to enter all areas 
of academia via cultural studies (Burton, 2011, 7-24). Constructivism aims to ‘denaturalise’ the social 
world. In other words, constructivist scholars aim to reveal how the institutions, practices and identities 
that people take as natural or given are social constructions. Data must be contextualised, situated within 
the social environment in which they are gathered (Hopf, 1998, 182). This debate led to the question of 
how to approach language in international affairs (Fierke, 2002, 351).  
First-generation IR scholars are very critical of discourse analysis. They criticise the discourse 
approach as being bad science and claim that it lacks testable theories and empirical analyses. In 
addition, traditional IR theorists consider discourse foreign to other theories and methods in the 
discipline because of its alleged rejection of research criteria (Milliken, 1999, 226). John Mearsheimer, 
for example, argues that discourse analysis gives no explanation as to why some discourses occur or 
why some discourses are dominant and that the explanation of change in the international world is 
lacking (Mearsheimer, 1994, 42). 
Jennifer Milliken provides a practical account of the use of discourse within the discipline of 
IR. She argues that discourse scholars in IR make three theoretical commitments, which she describes 
as the ‘internally established basis’ for the critical evaluation of discourse studies (Milliken, 1999, 231). 
Besides this, she argues that a theoretical and methodological framework can limit a researcher’s 
interpretation of a topic. Therefore, the lack of a formal methodology in discourse analysis allows the 
researcher to understand the constructed nature of discourses and to challenge the dominant discourses 
that become legitimate ‘normalisations’ in everyday language (Milliken, 1999. 230).   
Discourse is a concept closely attached to critical theory and poststructuralist approaches.7 
Poststructuralism’s critical theorists build on a relativist philosophy of science and a sociology of 
knowledge; they propose to debate the nature of international relations and discuss ways for studying 
them. In their view, there are no ‘structures’ in international politics, other than the structures people 
construct by interacting. Poststructuralists aim to deconstruct readings of reality and see the discourse 
approach as a way of doing this. Moreover, poststructuralists believe that science is ‘power disguised in 
knowledge’ (Adler, 2013, 135). Poststructuralist discourse theory adopts an anti-essentialist point of 
view with a strong emphasis on the contingent character of reality, which it regards as constructed 
through practices involving power and knowledge (Angermuller, 2015, 510). However, critics are 
                                                 
6 Constructivism is an IR theory that focusses on the social construction of the world; the world we know is not simply out 
there but exists based on understanding of each other’s actions and assigning meaning to them. In IR, this means that it is 
the very interactions with others that create identities and interests of s tates (Wendt, 1999, 168). 
7 Poststructuralism offers a way of s tudying ‘how knowledge i s produced’. It argues that because history and culture 
condition the s tudy of underlying s tructures, both are subject to biases and misinterpretations. A poststructuralist approach 
argues that to understand an object i t is necessary to s tudy both the object i tself and the systems of knowledge that 
produced the object (Angemuller, 2015, 510). 
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sceptical about poststructuralism, arguing that this theory lacks useful applications and is too far from 
the ‘real world’ (Edkins, 1999, 1).  
Since the publication of Milliken’s article, the discourse approach has slowly shifted from 
poststructuralism to the middle ground of constructivism. Alexander Wendt, founding father of 
constructivism, argues that international politics are ‘socially constructed’. By this he means that ‘the 
structures of human associations are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, 
and … the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than 
given by nature’ (Wendt, 1999, 1). Wendt argues that identity, ideology, discourse, culture and norms 
matter just as much as power and self-interest in shaping the structure of the international system. 
Discourse scholars theorise and investigate the relationship between actors, structure and text, and 
constructivism welcomed discourse as way of examining this relationship. The development of the 
constructivist school brought language, communication and discourse closer to the core of the IR 
discipline (Holzscheiter, 2014, 144-150).  
Nowadays, constructivists turn to the discourse approach when they want to identify and 
operationalise ideas, identities, or norms to demonstrate that these facts are not natural but are a result 
of discursive practices and are socially constructed (Holzscheiter, 2014, 144-150). Still, critical 
traditional IR scholars argue that constructivism in itself is not a theory but a process or an approach. 
They question the fact that constructivism makes no account for the structure of the international system 
on its own (Holzscheiter, 2014, 144-150). Burton counters this challenge by explaining that although 
constructivism may be unable to account for the structure of the international system, it can certainly 
contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between states within the international system, 
as well as to an understanding of actors in terms of their interests, identities and behaviours (Burton, 
2011, 7-24).  
 
2.3.Discourse and the Study of National Identity  
 
National identity has been the topic of a wide variety of logical, philosophical, psychological, 
sociological, political and other discussions for quite some time (Wodak, 2009, 10). However, there is 
no clear consensus in the literature on what exactly ‘national identity’ is. In fact, even the concept of 
‘nation’ is ambiguous. Anthony Smith argues that a nation is ‘a named human population sharing a 
historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy 
and common legal rights and duties for all members’ (Smith, 1991, 14). In his view, national identity 
incorporates people into the nation and gives them meaning and purpose beyond what they can generate 
themselves. National identity is a mechanism for giving people a sense of individual and collective 
worth, which they need to function in a national community. Smith assigns a functional meaning to 
national identity, which he almost equates to the notion of ‘nation’ (Smith, 1991, 14).  
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David Miller ascribes a less functional meaning to national identity, arguing that national identity is 
largely unknowable because it is implicit or below consciousness. However, he believes that people 
share beliefs that they belong together and that this feeling of ‘belonging together’ is closely attached to 
national identity (Miller, 1998, 15). In contrast to Smith, Benedict Anderson argues that national identity 
is the product of discourse. Anderson writes that nations are invented or imagined where they did not 
exist before. If a nation is an imagined community and at the same time a mental construct, an imaginary 
complex of ideas, then this image is real to the extent that one is convinced of it, believes in it and 
identifies with it emotionally (Anderson, 1983, 15). This imaginary community reaches the minds of 
those it convinces through discourse (Anderson, 1983, 15). Actors, like individuals, position themselves 
in relation to other states by adopting certain discourses and not others. (Epstein, 2010, 341).  
‘Identity’ is an important theme in the discipline of IR. Historically, issues concerning the 
development and change of a sovereign state in the context of the larger system are at the core of IR. 
Neorealism argues that identities and interests are given before states even start to interact with each 
other (Jackson & Sørensen, 2016, 30). Non-traditional IR scholars oppose this approach. Constructivism 
and poststructuralism adopt a relational view of identity. They analyse identity for its own sake, in order 
to make sense of the formation and transformation of collective identities, such as a state or nation. 
(Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015, 12). Constructivism brought the study of ‘identity’ to the centre of IR 
(Epstein, 2010, 329). The constructivist goal in the study of identity is to understand how identities are 
constructed, what norms and practices accompany their reproduction and how they construct each other. 
According to Ted Hopf ‘Identities offer each actor in IR an understanding of other actors, their nature, 
motives, interests, probable actions, attitudes, and role in any given political context’ (Hopf, 1998, 173). 
Constructivist scholars clearly defend the position that national identities are not given; identities are 
developed and sustained in the interactions of actors (Zehfluss, 2009, 38).  
In addition, Alexander Wendt explains that the concept of ‘identity’ serves to establish a 
distinction from rationalism, which argues that the identity of an actor is external and prior to the process 
of international politics (Wendt, 1995, 71-72). Identity defines the relationship between two or more 
related entities or actors. The concept of identity however is never static, unchanging or substantial.  
Rather, it is an element situated in the flow of time, ever-changing and involved in a process (Wodak, 
2009, 10). Therefore, a national identity is not something ‘given’. A key point of Alexander Wendt’s 
constructivism theory is to show how the international system shapes the identities and interests of states 
and how this relates to the international system (Wendt, 1999, 11). Wendt’s key move concerning the 
‘self’ of identity was to take the personification of the state out of the realm of disciplinary conventions 
and to proclaim it a fact. For Wendt, states are people in a real, rather than an ‘as if’, sense (Wendt, 
1999, 11). However, Wendt’s theory has endured criticism from within the reflectivist turn for the way 
it has entrenched a fixed, essentialised understanding of identity in the IR discipline. Charlotte Epstein 
sees Wendt’s theory of national identity as ‘pinning down the state as a closed, unified entity and thereby 
entrenching the domestic-international divide, even more than neo-realists’ (Epstein, 2010, 331). 
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Epstein argues that the discourse approach to the study of identity is useful in the sense that it does not 
begin by presuming a self, whether that of an individual, a state, or a nation (Epstein, 2010, 341). It 
offers a way of analysing different levels, from state to individual, without presuming who the key actor 
is or what the ‘self’ should look like (Epstein, 2010, 343).  
Discourse is one of the most important sources of social identification in a community (i.e., the 
nation in a broad sense). The sense of belonging to a community goes beyond the political lines drawn 
on maps. Studying discourse can therefore reveal how a national identity is constructed and who the 
actors in play are (Yus, 2015, 498). The question here is who possesses and shapes the national identity, 
the ‘self’. Linus Hagström and Karl Gustafsson argue that two factors can change identity: identity 
entrepreneurs and emotional attachments. ‘Identity entrepreneurs are political actors who promote their 
desired versions of identity though the discursive representation of issues and actors’ (Hagström & 
Gustafsson, 2015, 8). Two kinds of forces come to play in the construction of national identity: the 
ability to produce and maintain a certain narrative or identity and the ability to transform identity when 
discourses are played against each other (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015, 8).  
The other factor that can change identity is emotional attachment. Whereas traditional 
approaches in IR have denied the role of emotions, regarding them as irrational, emotions play a large 
role in identity construction. ‘Identity is constructed through the forging of an emotional allegiance that 
makes us feel like we belong’ (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015, 10). When people identify themselves 
with a particular notion, they feel part of a certain collective. Therefore, without emotional attachment, 
identity entrepreneurs are less likely to succeed.  
In the case of China, it is often hard to define who is dominant in shaping national identity: the 
government, the Party (CCP) or other external factors. Therefore, it is important to study of ‘national 
identity’, to identify who the actors are and how national identity is socially constructed. When studying 
national identity, it is important to remove the personification of the state. This prevents us from 
regarding the state as a solid object, which would be especially problematic in the case of China.  
As stated above, identity is constructed through the forging of an emotional allegiance that 
makes us feel like we belong. National identity can be changed by two factors: identity entrepreneurs 
and emotional attachments. Other actors play an important role in identity construction. A sudden or 
unexpected move by other actors can therefore reveal if identity production will be maintained or 
transformed by identity entrepreneurs and emotional attachments. In this case study, I aim to discover 
how the official Chinese state media constructs a narrative of China’s national identity when it is 
subjected to changes from external actors (Taiwan and the US). Moreover, I intend to find out if this 
narrative changed as a result of the Trump-Tsai phone call.  
In the next section, I will look deeper into the triangular relationship between the U.S, China 
and Taiwan, in order to provide a historical background, which is important for understanding how 
different actors interact in cross-strait and Sino-U.S. relations.  
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2.4.The US, China and Taiwan: A Triangular Relationship 
 
 
Actors in public spheres behave and position themselves based on discourses that circulate in society 
and the media. Analysing discourse can help us to understand how actors identify themselves in relation 
to other actors and, therefore, to better understand how actors in international politics behave (Schneider, 
2014, 693-703). The cross-strait issue is an interesting case study for examining national identity since 
China and Taiwan describe their national identity in conflicting ways. According to Taiwan’s 
constitution, it still has sovereignty over the entire mainland region, whereas the PRC regards the island 
of Taiwan as a region belonging to the PRC (Chen, 2017, 888).   
The complex origins of this relationship can be traced back to the Chinese Civil War between 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) government and Mao Zedong’s CCP forces. In 1949, the KMT 
retreated to Taiwan with the ROC, while Mao established the PRC. The ROC was under the rule of 
martial law for 38 years. In 1987, president Chiang Ching-kuo abandoned martial law, which made the 
establishment of other political parties possible. Political elites made the establishment of democratic 
institutions possible, which allowed civilian courts, for example, to operate free without interference 
from the military (Rigger, 1999, 131). The first presidential election took place in 1996. Since then, the 
ROC has made the transition to democracy, while communism has remained the status quo in the PRC. 
(Rigger, 1999, 3).   
However, in the international world, the ROC faced difficulties. In 1945, the ROC, as the 
representative government of China, became a founding member of the United Nations (UN). In the 
1960’s, the PRC attempted to join the UN, but due to the One-China policy it was only possible to have 
one government represented in the UN. More and more countries began to establish diplomatic ties with 
the PRC, which eventually led to the removal of the ROC from the UN in 1971. (Huang, 2003, 78-87) 
In 1991, the ROC accepted that it no longer controlled the mainland. However, this did settle 
the complex relationship between the PRC and the ROC. During the 2000 elections, the KMT invented 
the term ‘1992 Consensus’, which indicated an agreement that both sides accepted the principle of ‘One 
China, different interpretations’ (一個中國，各自表述). The KMT and the CCP accepted this 
principle, but both sides held on to different interpretations. The CCP believes that there is one, 
undivided sovereignty of China and that the government of the PRC is the sole legitimate representative 
of that sovereignty. The KMT believes that there is one, undivided sovereignty of China and that the 
government of the ROC is the sole legitimate representative of that sovereignty. (Wei, 2016, 68-70) 
The geo-political position of Taiwan plays an important role in the relationship between China 
and the US. The US has military forces in Taiwan and will defend Taiwan if war were to occur in the 
Taiwan strait. This seemingly contradictory policy has three goals: to sustain Taiwan’s freedom, 
democracy and autonomy in the face of military pressure from the PRC; to assure the PRC that the US 
does not support Taiwan’s declaration of independence; and to ensure that cross-strait relations remain 
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peacefully (Chen, 2017, 886-890). The Taiwan Relations Act ‘enables the American people and the 
people on Taiwan to maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official Government 
representation and without diplomatic relations’ (Carter, 1979). The ‘six assurances’ for Taiwan is a 
term for the guidelines used by the U.S. government in its relationship with Taiwan. President Reagan 
initiated these guidelines in 1982. Successive U.S. administrations reaffirmed the guidelines but did not 
make them binding (Dumbaugh, 1998, 1-25).  
With regard to the different actors involved in the cross-strait issue, Jonathan Sullivan argues 
that the president of the ROC is a sensible and visible actor. He argues that the PRC’s position is 
relatively stable and that the Chinese leaders do not face the prospect of an electoral system so far 
(Sullivan, 2013, 12). Besides, the US does not view Taiwan as a core issue on its political agenda. There 
are many different political positions in Taiwan regarding the cross-strait issue. Besides, U.S. relations 
with China are of crucial importance for Taiwan, and therefore much importance is attributed to the 
position of the ROC’s president on cross-strait relations (Sullivan, 2013, 12). In 2000, the first 
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), came to power and Chen Shui-Bian became 
president. The DPP originally favoured Taiwanese independence. Chen’s governing style was much 
criticised, and he was accused of corruption. Against this background, the KMT won the 2008 
presidential elections, which indicated a desire to establish stable cross-strait relations and improve 
Taiwan’s competitiveness in the world (Cai, 2008, p.5-8). 
When the KMT came back to power with Ma Ying-jeou as the new president, the PRC and ROC 
came closer together literally. The Ma-Xi meeting in 2015 (馬習會) was the first meeting between the 
leaders of the ROC and the PRC. However, the KMT lost again in 2016 due to a lack of consensus on 
the future of cross-strait relations in Taiwan and the openly fought elections on the island. (Sullivan & 
Sapir, 2013, 12) 
The DPP returned to power in Taiwan in 2016. Since the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen as the 
new president of Taiwan, cross-strait relations have come under pressure from the PRC. This is because 
the DPP originally favoured independence for Taiwan, but the Tsai administration has refused to accept 
the 1992 Consensus (Chen, 2017, 886-890). The 1992 Consensus (’92 Consensus) is a critical issue in 
cross-strait relations, since the DPP disputes it ever existed. However, for the PRC, the 1992 Consensus 
is the basis for the development of healthy cross-strait relations. The attitude of the US is also crucial in 
cross-strait relations. As explained in the introduction, President-elect Donald Trump seemed to 
undermine the One-China policy in a move that could have huge consequences for the status quo8 
between China, Taiwan and the US.  
It is important to research if and why this phone call challenges the status quo in cross-strait 
relations. When we study national identities, different actors come into play. In the case of China, a 
discourse analysis is a good instrument to examine how national identity is constructed, which actors 
                                                 
8 With the term ‘status quo’, I  refer to ‘no reunification, no independence, and no war’ (不統,不獨,不武) 
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play a part in it and, most importantly, what role cross-strait relations and external actors play in the 
construction of China’s national identity by the official Chinese state media.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
For my thesis, I will conduct a discourse analysis.  A discourse analysis is ‘a way of analysing texts in 
order to find out what and how people are communicating and how such communication relates to 
reality’ (Fairclough, 2012). Newspapers are a tool for creating a discourse about a certain topic, and 
daily newspapers are a useful tool to discover dominant discourses (Mautner, 2008, 32). Journalists 
create a certain version of ‘reality’ for their readers. Analysing the construction of a discourse can 
provide an insight into the political position of an actor, in this case the CCP (Schneider, 2013). This is 
why I chose party newspapers that publish articles in line with the thought and ideology of the CCP. In 
order to conduct a discourse analysis, it is important to examine original language materials (Schneider, 
2013). Therefore, all the articles I analyse are written in Mandarin Chinese, and the translations are my 
own.  
The first step was to select the articles I wanted to analyse. For the period after the phone call, I 
chose a time frame of 9 days. I chose this time frame because most articles were written in the days 
immediately after the call and a smaller number of in-depth articles were written a week afterwards. For 
the period before the phone call, I chose a period of 6 months. It is impossible to conduct a complete 
discourse analysis; as Teun van Dijk argues, there is no such a thing as a ‘full’ analysis (van Dijk, 2001, 
98). Therefore, I chose this 6-month period randomly, without considering other events in the period 
before the phone call. For both time frames, I made a first selection and analysed that. Based on the 
findings from that first sample, I made a second selection, and so on. At a certain point, I found that I 
had reached a saturation point, where I merely found more of the same (Mautner, 2008, 33).  
My analysis will focus largely on the discourse topics in the articles. I will identify those 
discourse topics by considering the content of the articles, the most occurring words throughout the 
articles and the different actors (Wodak, 2008, 16-17). At the end of each discourse topic, I will connect 
the discussion to the construction of China’s national identity. I will then examine intertextuality, 
language and pictures in the articles and also link this discussion to China’s national identity.  
Finally, I position my findings in a broader context in order to discover how the state constructs 
a discourse regarding cross-strait relations and how this constructs a narrative of national identity.  
Moreover, I examine whether a significant change has occurred in this narrative due to the Trump-Tsai 
phone call. The context provided in the literature review, which provides information about established 
rules and norms, is an essential part of the discourse analysis. It is important to be critical and analyse 
this context, to prevent incorrect interpretation of specific linguistic behaviour (Wodak, 2008, 11).  
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4. Materials  
 
I analyse a set of newspaper articles from two different Chinese newspapers, both state-led. Since my 
research question focusses on the discourse of the Party, I do not consider commercial newspapers. In 
total, I selected 21 articles, 14 from the period after the phone call and 7 from the 6 months before the 
phone call. Both newspapers have an English language version for a foreign audience. I focus on articles 
in the official language of the newspapers, Mandarin Chinese, because translations of official 
publications can lead to slightly different interpretations of the texts. 
The first newspaper I chose was the People’s Daily (人民日報). The People’s Daily is a Party 
paper (党报), which function as a mouthpiece of the CCP at various levels of the Party’s hierarchy. The 
People’s Daily represents the viewpoints of the central government and can, therefore, provide insights 
into the thoughts of party officials (Stockmann, 2013, 67-73). 
The second newspaper I chose was the Global Times (環球消息). The Global Times is a semi-
official newspaper, which indicates that this newspaper enjoys a little more freedom but is still heavily 
influenced by the thought of the Party (Stockmann, 2013, 71). The Global Times is under the supervision 
of the People’s Daily and focusses on international issues. This newspaper takes a strong pro-
government, nationalistic and patriotic stance (Branigan, 2009) 
The first step in my analysis was to select the articles from the two newspapers. The website of 
the People’s Daily makes it relatively easy to search for articles in chronological order. This paper 
published 18 articles about the phone call in the 9 days after the event. Regarding articles published by 
the Global Times, it was more difficult to find articles within a specific time frame on a certain topic. 
The website of the Global Times lacks the functions to search for a specific time frame or to search in 
chronological order. When searching for the ‘Trump-Tsai phone call’ (特朗普与蔡英文通电话), I got 
436,138 hits. These included articles with only the terms ‘Trump’, ‘Tsai’ or ‘phone call’ in them. One 
reason for this large number of articles could be that the Global Times often reposts articles or videos 
from other media sources, such as Xinhua and CCTV. Because of this, I searched for the articles on 
Google. I added the specific date of the phone call to my search terms. I also looked at ‘related articles’ 
when I found an article that was useful for me. One article I found focused more on the South China 
Sea dispute but mentioned the phone call multiple times and was published right after the event. Hence, 
I decided to include this article in my analysis. For the six months before the call, I searched for the term 
‘cross-strait relations’ (两岸关系). I sought articles in the period from June until December 2016. In the 
People’s Daily, I found a total of around 850 articles on cross-strait relations published in this particular 
period. When searching for ‘cross-strait relations’ on the website of the Global Times, I got 285,933 
hits. However, this again was not limited to a certain time frame and including all reposts. Therefore, I 
searched for the terms on Google specifying the dates.  
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5. Research Findings 
 
I now discuss how the two state-led newspapers, the People’s Daily and the Global Times, construct a 
position regarding cross-strait relations. I focus mostly on the articles that were published right after the 
phone call and compare them with articles from before the phone call.  
In the first part of this section I discuss the three discourse topics I identified. The second part 
focusses on intertextuality, language and pictures. I chose to separate the second part from the first part 
in order to identify differences between communication strategies and the written words. After each 
discussion, I link the findings to the construction of the national identity of China by the newspapers.   
 
5.1 Discourse Topics  
 
I discuss three discourse topics that I uncovered when analysing the articles. First, I discuss the two 
main actors in the articles: Tsai and Trump. Second, I look at the discourse topic ‘China’s power’ in 
relation to different relationships. Third, I analyse discussions of Taiwanese independence versus 
unification. A table with a chronological overview of the articles from the respective newspapers, 
including the different discourse topics, abbreviations and Chinese and English titles, can be found in 
Appendix 1. A list of all the articles with authors and dates can be found in Appendix 3.  
 
5.1.1 Tsai and Trump (蔡英文和特朗普) 
 
The first discourse topic I discuss is the two main actors of the phone call: Tsai and Trump. In the 14 
articles I analysed that were published directly after the call, Trump is mentioned 193 times and Tsai 
133 times. Confusion existed about who was behind the call. Multiple articles cited the Chinese Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, calling the phone call a ‘little trick’ set up by Taiwan (这只是台湾方面
搞的一个小动作) (PD08). According to Minister Wang Yi, it was ‘a little trick that will not change 
anything about the One-China principle, which is the cornerstone of a healthy Sino-U.S. relationship’ 
(PD06).  
Tsai Ing-wen is frequently mentioned in the articles, as might be expected. Tsai is mentioned in 
every article, except one (see Appendix 1). Various articles suggest different motives for Tsai Ing-wen 
making the phone call. One article from the Global Times suggests that Tsai wanted to fix a mistake she 
made by sending Hilary Clinton a gift shortly before the presidential election in the US, on the 
assumption that Clinton would win the election. According to this article, she made the phone call, 
taking advantage of Trump’s unpredictable attitude, in order to fix her ‘wrong bet’ (押错宝)(GT05). A 
number of other articles suggest Tsai’s declining popularity in Taiwan as a reason for the phone call. 
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These articles claim that Taiwan’s Pan-Green Camp9 saw this phone call as a way of relieving some of 
the pressure created by public disapproval of the Tsai administration and of focusing more on the U.S. 
issue (GT05, GT09). There is no real consensus in the articles with respect to why Tsai made the call, 
but most of them suggest that the domestic situation within Taiwan was the main reason. 
Many articles discuss that Tsai has difficulties governing the island due to her refusal to accept 
the 1992 Consensus.  Moreover, one article mentions that the Kuomintang thinks that she should ‘not 
feel so good about herself’ (不应过度自我感觉良好)(GT05) and advises that ‘she should take care of 
the people of Taiwan’ (GT05)(把老百姓照顾好，让人民有感最重要). By this, the author meant that 
Tsai should not expect that U.S. policy towards Taiwan to change, since it was not yet clear what the 
call would mean.  
According to the articles, there are multiple reasons why President-elect Donald Trump 
accepted the phone call. On the one hand, various articles argue that this was just a beginner’s error. 
One article argues that while Trump knows facts, he does not know the reasons behind them (他对中
国和中美关系是知其一不知其二)(PD09). Moreover, the article argues that he has no diplomatic 
experience and has a reputation of not playing by the rules (特朗普不熟悉外交，又在竞选期间有 
‘不按规矩出牌’的名声)(GT03). Furthermore, various articles argue that his character is highly 
unpredictable, which implies that it is too early to say if this phone call will really change U.S. foreign 
policy. Some articles also refer to the fact that President-elect Trump had not yet taken office, and thus 
the relevance of the phone call should not be overstated (PD08).  
On the other hand, several articles argue that Trump deliberately accepted the phone call. One 
article from the Global Times even states directly that Trump took the phone call ‘intentionally’ (这居
心……) (GT08). Another article from the Global Times argues that Trump aimed to safeguard the 
interests of weapon sales to, and agricultural trade with, Taiwan: ‘Trump, who is originally a 
businessman, wants to change the trade deficit that the US has with Taiwan’ (GT07). One article 
mentions that while he might not have realised that the phone call would threaten national security, he 
does know that he can earn money from Taiwan (不理解自己愚蠢的电话威胁了我们的国家安全，
同时也是故意的，因为据报道他想在台湾修建酒店，充实自己的钱包)(GT09). The most 
frequent motive that the papers mentioned for Trump’s decision to take the phone call was to test China’s 
reaction. Out of 14 articles, 5 suggested this reason. Several articles claimed that he aimed to determine 
his China-strategy ones he assumed office. Both newspapers mention the so-called ‘Taiwan Gang’ (台
湾帮) multiple times. This is a group of Trump’s policy advisors who all have a pro-Taiwan point of 
view. Several articles claim that the ‘Taiwan Gang’ played a role in the phone call and that their 
                                                 
9 The political scene in the ROC is divided into two camps: the pro-unification KMT, People First Party (PFP) and New 
Party forming the Pan-Blue Coalition; and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the pro-independence Taiwan 
Sol idarity Union (TSU) forming the Pan-Green Coalition. (Fell, 2012, 84-85) 
16 
statements about the PRC were humiliating and disrespectful. Multiple articles raise the fact that 
Trump’s behaviour did not end with this call. Afterwards, he tweeted and called Tsai the ‘president of 
Taiwan’, which most authors found ‘unacceptable’ (GT03).  Intentionally or not, an article published in 
the People’s Daily asserts that when the US makes mistakes on this issue, it will always be bad for Sino-
U.S. relations (PD08). 
Comparing the above findings to what the papers say about Trump and Tsai in the six months 
before the phone call, a few things caught my attention. With regard to Tsai, many articles published in 
the six months before the phone call ironically claim that her biggest ‘achievement’ was not recognising 
the 1992 Consensus (GT02). The 1992 consensus is almost always linked to Tsai and particularly to her 
failure to recognise it. The 1992 Consensus is a much more prominent theme in the articles before the 
call than right after it. The official state media firmly believes that because Tsai is reluctant to recognise 
the 1992 Consensus, which claims that both sides of the strait belong to one China, cross-strait relations 
have not gone well since she assumed office (PD02). One journalist for the People’s Daily argues that 
not accepting the 1992 Consensus effectively changes the status quo in cross-strait relations, since the 
1992 Consensus is supposed to be the basis for a healthy relationship between the two sides of the strait 
(PD02).  
Another point that I found striking is that several articles claim that Tsai’s words do not match 
her actions on the cross-strait issue. One article in particular focusses on Tsai’s inauguration speech. 
The author of the article labels her words an unqualified answer, referring to not accepting the 1992 
consensus,  and even calls her a liar (说谎也显得如此从容不迫)(GT02). This author is of the opinion 
that Tsai’s inauguration speech was just an act. She expressed the intention ‘to do everything in her 
power to maintain normal communication and to maintain stability in cross-strait relations’ (GT02). 
However, the author suggested that her actions, such as not accepting the 1992 Consensus, do not match 
her words in the speech (GT02).  
The articles published before the call do not mention Trump, the ‘Taiwan Gang’ or the fact that 
Tsai and the US were becoming closer at the time. As a matter of fact, the opposite comes across from 
the articles. One article in particular focusses on American experts on China, who warned that Tsai was 
getting closer to the US (PD04). These alleged experts claimed that the US did not want Taiwan to 
become independent or to rely too much on the support of the US.  
 
These statements concerning the two main actors, Tsai and Trump, reveal certain aspects of the national 
identity that these state-led newspapers aim to construct around China. I conclude from these statements 
that Trump is largely granted the benefit of the doubt due to his lack of experience, whereas Tsai and 
the DPP are portrayed as having the clear motive of getting closer to the US, perhaps due to Tsai’s 
alleged declining popularity on the island. Immediately after the phone call, the Chinese government 
began serious negotiations with the US and not with Taiwan, implying that the US, and Trump in 
particular, is the unpredictable actor in the triangular relationship. China itself is projected as the 
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dominant actor but also the actor that is ‘hurt’ by this move, by the ‘Taiwan Gang’ and by the fact that 
Trump called Tsai the ‘president of Taiwan’. The official state media frequently reports that this the 
Taiwan issue is a case of national sovereignty and territory. The KMT appears to be partly included in 
the national identity of China, since they are cited to strengthen some of the journalist’s statements in 
various articles; the DPP and Tsai are generally labelled as outsiders.  
 
5.1.2 China’s Power (中国的能力) 
 
A prominent discourse topic that is mentioned in several articles is the notion of ‘China’s power’(中国
的能力). The phrase itself does not occur often, but many sentences and phrases refer to the concept of 
China’s changing position on the world stage, China’s rise in power and the One-China policy. The 
articles I analysed that were published after the phone call mention the concept of ‘China’s power’ in 
the context of three different relationships: Sino-U.S. relations, the relationship with the international 
community and cross-strait relations. Since all three relationships have an impact on the relationship 
between the PRC and the ROC, I briefly discuss each of them.  
 
Sino-U.S. Relations 
 
First, the concept of ‘power’ arises mostly with regard to Sino-U.S. relations. As stated by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, for the PRC the One-China policy is the basis for healthy Sino-
U.S. relations. If the US were to break with the One-China policy, it would destroy Sino-U.S. relations.  
One article suggests that Trump would have to dedicate his whole office term in order to achieve this. 
(为此特朗普恐怕要用他的整个任期’专门干这些事’) (GT03). This statement suggests that an 
enormous amount of power would be required to break with the One-China policy. Another point 
mentioned with regard to Sino-U.S. relations and ‘China’s power’ was the fact that because of China’s 
rapid growth, the US is no longer the dominant force in cross-strait relations. A journalist writing for 
the People’s Daily emphasises that it is difficult to curtail China’s rise: ‘No matter how the United States 
adjusts its foreign strategy, it will be difficult to rule out cooperation with China and hinder the pace of 
China’s progress’ (美国不论如何调整对外战略，都难以排除同中国的合作，难以撼动中国前进
的步伐) (PD09). An article in the Global Times reinforces this argument by arguing that ‘previous U.S. 
administrations have thought all along about how to curtail and slow down the rising power of China’ 
(如何遏制延缓中国崛起一直是美国历届政府考虑的问题)(GT07). Furthermore, the journalist 
writes that ‘using the Taiwan issue in order to curtail China's development will not hinder ultimate 
China's rise’(通过台湾问题遏制中国发展，并不能阻挠中国的最终崛起)(GT07). It is remarkable 
that several articles express the opinion that China should take responsibility to present Trump with the 
common sense facts of the cross-strait issue. Many articles present the PRC as a kind of ‘teacher’ that 
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needs to show Trump that Sino-U.S. frictions will not help the US be ‘great again’.10 Several articles 
claim that the US does not have many cards to play against China anymore, having lost its leverage by 
supporting the Philippines in the South China Sea Arbitration and by helping South Korea (PD10).11 An 
journalist for the Global Times claimed that ‘Trump will definitely return to the big picture of a good 
Sino-U.S. relationship’ (他最终肯定会回归到中美两国良好关系的大格局上来)(GT07). Finally, in 
relation to Sino-U.S. relations, one article quotes a poem: ‘No flowing clouds could ever block your 
vision when you are at the highest level’ (不畏浮云遮望眼，只缘身在最高层) (PD09). By citing this 
poem, the journalist refers to China’s long-term strategy, which should guide the country in dealing with 
changes in Sino-U.S. relations.  
 
China and the International Community  
 
Many articles stress that the recognition of the One-China policy is already entrenched in the 
international community. Minister Wang Yi is often quoted as saying: ‘It is impossible to change the 
One-China framework that the international community has already formed’ (PD06). The use of quotes 
from government officials, often in the beginning of an article, can be seen to add credibility to the 
writer’s arguments. Referring back to an official quote in the conclusion of an article can reemphasise 
the reliability of the arguments.  
The Global Times holds a firmer position on the One-China policy and the international 
community than the People’s Daily: ‘There is no power or motivation in the world to break with the 
One-China policy and there is no power that can implement an opposite policy and ensure a positive 
outcome’ (GT03). This sentence implies that the PRC controls the implementation of the One-China 
policy in the international community and that the PRC is now the dominant power in cross-strait 
relations, not the US.  
 An article from Global Times uses a remarkable example to illustrate how the international 
community implements the One-China policy. The article reports that in 2015, General Secretary Xi 
Jinping and former leader of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, held an historical meeting (GT10). Both leaders 
were called ‘mister’, which, according to the article, gave Ma ‘face’12 . When Ma took part in the 
Malaysian International Forum, he insisted on using the title ‘Former President of the Republic of 
China’, which the organisers rejected. This example shows that the official state media believes that 
Taiwan does not have the right to talk about the conditions of the One-China policy and that China is 
the dominant factor in cross-strait relations (GT10). 
                                                 
10 This refers to ‘Make America Great Again’, the presidential campaign slogan of Donald Trump 
11 This  article notes that the US spent a  s ignificant amount of money supporting the Phi lippines in the South China Sea 
Arbitration without seeing any results. In fact, the Philippines won the arbitration, but China refused to accept the outcome 
of the tribunal. Regarding South Korea, the US deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South 
Korea  in order to shoot down approaching missiles from North Korea. This article argues that because of the help it received 
from the US, South Korea can no longer defend i tself.  
12 ‘Giving face’ (给面子) means giving someone dignity or prestige.  
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Cross-Strait Relations 
 
The impact of the discourse of ‘China’s power’ on cross-strait relations partly overlaps with the 
issues raised above. The first point that comes to light is that the PRC now has the ‘ability’ to defend its 
bottom line, which consists of adhering to the 1992 consensus and the One-China policy. An author 
from the Global Times argues the following: ‘If the Taiwan independence separatist force, or any other 
force, causes Taiwan to split from China, or if the possibility of a peaceful reunification is completely 
lost, China will have to take a non-peaceful approach and any other necessary measures to safeguard 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (如果 ‘台独’分裂势力以任何名义、任何方式造成台
湾从中国分裂出去的事实，或者和平统一的可能性完全丧失，中国将不得不采取非和平的方式
以及其它必要措施，捍卫国家主权和领土完整) (GT10) 
An article from the Global Times mentions that the PRC has the ability to punish any unusual 
moves made by Tsai or her authorities and that the PRC has the power to damage Taiwan’s status in the 
international world. It is striking that a small number of articles in the Global Times mention the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), whereas the People’s Daily does not mention the PLA. Not only does one 
article claim that ‘we’, referring to its audience (the people of the PRC), have to remember that the army 
is called the ‘Liberation’13 army, it also proclaims the power of the army: ‘The army is as strong as iron’ 
(军队是铁打的) (GT10). According to this article, China’s rise has made it possible for the PRC to 
defend its so-called ‘bottom line’ in cross-strait relations. Concerning Taiwan’s status in the 
international world, the same article argues: ‘Taiwan's supposed ability to obtain support from the 
outside world is not a substitute for the importance of a good understanding of the mainland's One-
China consensus.  This is an undoubtable conclusion’( 台湾从外部世界能够得到所谓‘支持’的总和
也替代不了它同大陆处理好 ‘一个中国’ 共识的重要性，这已是个没有悬念的结论) (GT03). 
  
Compared these findings to the articles published in the period before the phone call, a few things stand 
out. With regard to the triangular relationship between China, Taiwan and the US, three out of six 
articles mention that the US is unsure if it will stick to its policy of supporting Taiwan. The PLA is also 
mentioned in the articles before the phone call. One author from the People’s Daily claims that ‘The 
PLA’s military has developed rapidly over the last 20 years and that Beijing has the ability to attack 
others and defend itself at sea’ (这 20年解放军军力发展很快，北京 ‘有令人信服的从海上攻击和
保卫自己的能力’) (PD05). Several articles express confidence that the US would not risk a military 
conflict for the sake of Taiwan’s interests or for Taiwanese independence (PD05). One article claimed 
that the ‘abandoning Taiwan theory’ (弃台论) had resurfaced in the US since Tsai assumed office on 
                                                 
13 The term ‘l iberation’ means: to free (a nation or area) from control by a  foreign or oppressive government. 
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the island (GT01). The article asserts that every time in history that cross-strait relations do not show 
any progress, the discussion arises as to whether or not the US should abandon their military support for 
Taiwan. The article expresses the belief that when the ‘Taiwan time bomb’ explodes, the US will be the 
victim (一旦台湾这个‘定时炸弹’爆炸，美国将成为受害者) (GT01). This argument refers to the 
belief that China’s military power has increased to the extent that if the US and China were to go to war 
over Taiwan, the US would lose.  
 
In relation to the discourse of ‘power’, both state-led newspapers examined here, aim to construct a 
national identity which, due to China’s alleged ‘rise’ in recent years, is strong and powerful. Regarding 
the position of Taiwan in the triangular relationship with China and the U.S, the media is clear in its 
statements that China is now the dominant actor and not the US. Moreover, the articles claim that this 
part of China’s identity is supported by the international community, which implements the One-China 
policy. China is able to defend itself and attack others who attack its national sovereignty and territory. 
The island of Taiwan is part of China’s national sovereignty and territory and if this were to be 
threatened, China would be able to take a non-peaceful approach. The role of the PLA is emphasised 
more in the period right after the phone call, whereas before the phone call articles focus more on the 
suggestion that the US might reconsider its support for Taiwan. Therefore, I suggest that the articles 
published after the phone call aim to reaffirm the China’s power as part of its national identity, in order 
to assure its audience that this event will not change anything for China. The power play between China 
and the US appears to play a big part in identity construction. In this regard, it seems that the articles 
aim to construct an idea of China as ‘unassailable’ and to affirm the claim that China would be 
unaffected if changes were to occur in Sino-U.S. or cross-strait relations. 
 
 
5.1.3 Taiwanese Independence versus Unification (台独與国家统一) 
 
Two important themes in the articles are Taiwanese independence and unification. As discussed in my 
introduction, Taiwanese independence refers to the possibility that the island of the ROC, will one day 
declare itself independent from the mainland, the PRC. Unification refers to the possibility that one day 
the mainland and the island will ‘reunite’. Even though these topics are opposed in meaning, I decided 
to combine them in this section since both terms denote a change from the status quo (no reunification, 
no independence and no war) in cross-strait relations. Considering the importance of both terms in cross-
strait relations, I expected both terms, especially Taiwanese independence, to feature often. However, 
in the articles right after the phone call, Taiwanese independence is only mentioned eight times and 
unification seven times. The Global Times uses both terms more often than the People’s Daily.  
Most articles provide very clear statements about the PRC’s view of Taiwanese Independence. 
One of the only articles to quote General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping, does so as follows: ‘We 
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would never allow anyone, any organisation, any political party, at any time, in any form, to split any 
piece of Chinese territory from China. This is determined by China's national will, national sentiment, 
by the history process and by China's strength’ (GT10). Next to Xi, several articles quote the Chinese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi or his spokesmen Geng Shuang, who held a press conference 
regarding the Trump-Tsai phone call on December 3, 2016 (GT06). The discourse on China’s power 
and strength overlaps with the discourse on Taiwanese independence. For example, the People’s Daily 
states: ‘We firmly uphold the One-China principle and oppose ‘Taiwanese independence’. We have a 
firm will, full confidence and enough capacity to hold back any form of ‘Taiwanese independence’’ 
(PD06). 
One remarkable statement made in an article published by the Global Times claimed that Tsai 
Ing-wen was slowly moving away from the path of  ‘Taiwanese independence’ and was eager to find a 
strong supporter (在 ‘台独’ 之路上渐行渐远的蔡英文，急于寻找强大的靠山)(GT10). Tsai Ing-
wen’s move away from the concept of independence could be a reason why the articles do not mention 
Taiwanese independence so often. However, this is doubtful. My view is that the phone call from Tsai 
to Trump could trigger independence forces in Taiwan to become more active, because it could imply 
that Taiwan and the US are moving closer towards each other. Not writing about this particular topic 
could be a way of preventing this trigger. 
With respect to unification, various articles also quote the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
or his spokesmen: ‘We have a firm will, full confidence and the ability to continue promoting the process 
of unification’(我们有坚定的意志、充分的信心、足够的能力持续推进国家统一进程)(PD06). 
Several articles mention the ‘ability’ of the PRC to unify. Here again, the discourse of China’s power 
overlaps and intertwines with the notion of unification. Most articles from the Global Times link this 
‘ability’ to peaceful and non-peaceful ways of unification. Concerning the ways of unification, one 
article claims that ‘the mainland will always actively strive for the best conditions for unification, as 
long as there is progress in cross-strait relations’ (GT10). However, the writer does clarify what is meant 
by ‘progress’ in cross-strait relations. It is unclear whether the article suggests that the phone call is a 
sign that so-called progress has stagnated 
 Concerning non-peaceful or military ways of unification, a small number of articles in the 
Global Times stress that ‘China never ruled out using ‘military forces for unification’’ (中国从未排除 
‘武统台湾’)(GT08). The most extreme position regarding unification comes from the article already 
mentioned several times in this paragraph, which claims: ‘Unification is only a matter of time, and it 
won’t take long. Some people repeatedly challenge the ‘red line’, which will only cause unification to 
come sooner’ (统一只是时间问题，并且这个时间也不会是无限期地长。有人一再挑战红线，那
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只会让统一的这一天早日到来!) (GT10)14 . According to this journalist, the phone call can be 
interpreted as an accelerator for unification.  
If we compare these statements to the articles written in the period before the phone call, a few 
things stand out. First, the terms ‘Taiwanese independence’ and ‘unification’ were both mentioned more 
often in the period before the phone call. Attitudes with regard to unification also differs slightly. The 
articles before the phone call do not mention any non-peaceful or military measures to achieve the goal 
of unification. They also do not claim that unification will come any time soon. 
In general, the tone of the articles with respect to Taiwanese independence is slightly more 
resistant prior to the call. One article from the People’s Daily reviews a speech made by Xi Jinping on 
July 1, 2016, in which he stated: ‘We firmly oppose any secessionist activities of any person, at any 
time, and in any form. More than 1.3 billion Chinese people and the entire Chinese nation will never 
agree!’ (PD01). In this article, three experts on the issue of Taiwan15 expand on Xi’s statements. They 
firmly state that: ‘The path to ‘Taiwanese independence’ cannot be taken. The path would lead to 
disaster for the Taiwanese people and would end in failure’ (‘台独’道路不可能走通，只会是一条给
台湾人民带来灾难，以失败告终的绝路) (PD10). The article continues: ‘The mainland has the ability 
to detect any activity of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and, therefore, any attempt will only lead to 
‘bloodshed’ (PD01). The discourse of China’s power is present in the notion that mainland has the 
ability to cause serious damage to Taiwan.  
The articles published before the phone call contain more references to the CCP. One article 
specifically mentions the historical mission of the CCP:  
 
The purpose of the revolution led by the CCP is to drive imperialism out of China and realise  
the dream of national unity, national independence, and the people being the owners of their 
own country. The Taiwan issue is the last unfinished part of the great motherland’s reunification.  
If the CCP wants to lead the people in realising the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation16 and wants to realise the ‘Two Centenary Goals’ 17, we have to solve the 
Taiwan issue in order to achieve national unity  (中国共产党领导的革命，宗旨就是要把帝
国主义赶出中国，实现国家统一、民族独立、人民当家作主的梦想。台湾问题是祖国
                                                 
14 More about these experts can be found in the chapter 5.3.  
15  More about the alleged ‘red line’ can be found in chapter 5.3 
16 The Chinese Dream (the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation) (中国梦) i s a term that was coined in 2013. It 
describes a national ethos and a  set of ideals for the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream refers to domestic and foreign 
pol icies in the context of Xi  Jinping’s vision. (Heberer, 2014, 113) 
17 The ‘Two Centenary Goals’ ( 两个一百年) are a  set of goals set out by General Secretary Xi  Jinping following the 18th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in 2012. The two centenaries refer to two 100-year anniversaries. 
The fi rst 100 years refers to the anniversary of the founding of the CCP in 2021. At this point, a full ‘Xiaokang society’ should 
be achieved. A ‘Xiaokang’ society literally means a  ‘moderately prosperous society’ with a  more equal distribution of 
wealth. The second 100 years refers to the anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049, at which point China should 
have become a  ‘strong, democratic, civilised, harmonious and modern socialist country’ (Kuhn, 2014, 15) 
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统一大业最后未完成的部分。中国共产党要带领全国人民实现中华民族伟大复兴的中
国梦，实现 ‘两个一百年’奋斗目标，就必须解决台湾问题，实现国家统一) (PD01).  
 
This article thus explains that unification is part of the ‘Two Centenary Goals’, but it does not explain 
the time frame in which this can be situated. From this paragraph, we can conclude that solving the 
Taiwan issue is essential for achieving national unity. National unity is also an essential part of the 
‘Chinese Dream’ and the ‘Two Centenary Goals’. However, it is still unclear what exactly is meant by 
the term ‘solve’.  
 
Analysing the discourses of Taiwanese independence and unification provides insights into how these 
two state-led newspapers, the People’s Daily and the Global Times, construct a narrative of Chinese 
national identity. Many articles quote Chinese high officials, such as Xi Jinping and Wang Yi. Their 
statements construct a sense of Chinese national identity whereby the people and the history of China 
and China’s power have made it so that Taiwanese independence is simply not an option. Moreover, a 
discourse is constructed around ‘national unity’, which is a concept close related to national identity.  
According to one article, solving the Taiwan issue is part of achieving so-called ‘national unity’. This 
national unity is part of the historical mission of the CCP, as claimed by the journalist and the experts 
consulted. Whether this national unity specifically refers to the unification of the mainland and Taiwan 
is not clear, but, as stated above, it is an essential part of the political campaigns of the ‘Chinese Dream’ 
and the ‘Two Centenary Goals’. In addition, no specific time frame is given for the alleged goal of 
unification.  
The discourses of unity and Taiwanese independence intertwine with the discourse of China’s 
power; China has, according to several authors, the power and strength to oppose any kind of Taiwanese 
independence and to actively strive for the reunification of the mainland and Taiwan. The tone with 
regard to reunification differs slightly in the articles published after the phone call. Some articles 
mention military methods of unification, which I believe are aimed at reassuring readers that China will 
one day achieve reunification, and that this goal will not be hindered by anything.  
 
5.2 Intertextuality, Language and Pictures  
 
In this chapter, I examine the communication strategies of the two newspapers by look at intertextuality, 
language and pictures. All the articles addressed in this study feature a significant amount of 
intertextuality. This can be explained by the fact that both the Global Times and the People’s Daily are 
state-owned newspapers, which stick relatively close to the official party line.  
The use of language differs between the articles published before the phone call and those 
published afterwards. One point, which I have mentioned before, is the idea of ‘peaceful unification’  
(和平統一 ) versus ‘non-peaceful’ ways (非和平的方式) or ‘military ways’ (‘武统台湾 ’) for 
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unification’, which arise respectively before and after the phone call. After the phone call, several 
articles threaten that if ‘these little tricks continue’ or if ‘separatist forces in Taiwan cause any trouble’, 
then the PRC will absolutely not be afraid to use non-peaceful or military approaches to safeguard 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity (PD08) (PD01).  
Articles published both before and after the phone call often use forceful and threatening 
language constructions. Constructions which occur often are: ‘if... then’ ‘if…. will only lead to’ ‘if…. 
it must’ ‘if….the result will be’ ‘if is needed… then’ (如果… 就) (….就) (如果… 只會) (….就必
须) (如果…后果)( 必要时…). The articles published before the phone call use constructions like 
these when referring to Tsai Ing-wen and the 1992 Consensus or the One-China principle. For example: 
‘If Taiwan really wants to be safe, it must continue to accept the One-China principle and allow the 
stable development of cross-strait relations’ (台湾如果真的想安全，最根本还是要接受一个中国原
则) (PD04). In the articles published after the phone call, these constructions are often used in reference 
to Trump, Taiwan, the US and the One-China policy. For example: ‘If Trump wants to break with the 
One-China policy, this will destroy Sino-U.S. relations’ (如果特朗普要突破 ‘一个中国’原则，就
要毁掉中美关系)(GT03) This kind of strong language is not surprising since the PRC is often very 
firm in its claims concerning national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and  the One-China policy is 
essential  to these claims.  
Another point that I find interesting is the use of the phrase ‘bottom line’ (底线), or ‘red line’ 
(红线), both of which are used in relation to the political foundation of Sino-U.S. relations: the One-
China policy. For example, ‘The red line between China and the US. is that the US. accepts the One-
China policy. The One-China policy is the basis for the diplomatic relations between the two (中美关
系中，最重要的问题就是台湾问题。中美交往的红线，就是美国认同一个中国原则。一个中国
原则是中美建交的基础)(GT10). This alleged ‘line’ is mentioned 18 times in total. It is interesting to 
see that different verbs are used to describe what the phone call meant for this ‘bottom’ or ‘red’ line: 
‘touch’, ‘cross’, ‘strongly cross’, ‘challenge’, ‘ignore’, ‘test’ and ‘finding out where the line is’. The two 
newspapers claim several times that ‘defending’ the bottom line poses no problem for China. The variety 
of different verbs used in the articles to describe the phone call suggests that the PRC itself was not yet 
sure what exactly to think of this move. ‘Touching’ (碰触) or ‘crossing’ (越过) differ quite a lot from 
each other. In the period before the call, the words ‘bottom line’ or ‘red line’ are not mentioned at all.  
Different articles use different nouns to describe the position of Taiwan: the Taiwan side (台湾
方面), the Taiwan region (台湾地区), the Taiwanese island (台湾岛内) and ‘Taiwan as part of China’ 
(台湾是中国一部分). These words imply that Taiwan is not an independent nation or state and belongs 
to mainland China. In addition, Tsai Ing-wen is often used in combination with the phrase ‘leader of the 
region’ ( 地区领导人). It is interesting to note that these descriptions of Taiwan occur more frequently 
in the articles published after the phone call than in those published before the call. This could be a way 
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of reassuring readers that the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is part of China will not change as a result of the 
phone call.  
Furthermore, I want to touch upon the language used regarding the discourse of China’s power. 
In relation to China’s power, ability, or capacity, a number of factors are notable, including the use of 
firm words and phrases, such as ‘undoubtable’ (没有悬念), ‘firmly’ (已然), ‘unable to restrain China’s 
rise’ (并不能阻挠中国的最终崛起) and ‘absolutely has the force’ (绝对有武力). In both the articles 
published before and after the phone call, the fact is emphasised that China has struggled for a long time 
throughout history and that it has now accumulated enough experience to lead cross-strait relations. This 
shift is indicated by sentences such as ‘China is gradually moving towards the centre of the world 
stage’(中国正逐渐走向世界舞台的中央)(PD01) and ‘the US is no longer the dominant force in the 
Taiwan strait situation’(美国已不再是台海形势的主导力量)(GT03). It is important to remember that 
these articles are written for a particular readership, the people of the PRC. Distributing this discourse 
thus serves the goal of reaffirming the strength of the PRC that has accumulated throughout history. In 
my view, this is aimed at legitimising the PRC’s claims on Taiwan.  
Throughout the articles, journalists consult or refer to various experts. A table providing an 
overview of all the experts mentioned in the articles can be found in Appendix 1.2. As an example to 
show what effect the use of experts in newspaper articles can have on readers, I use one article from the 
People’s Daily (PD01). This article mentions three different ‘experts’ on the issue of Taiwan, who are 
consulted to express their opinion on Xi’s speech18. According to the article, these experts are all from 
mainland China and all work in research institutes. Their function in the article is basically to explain 
Xi’s speech. They analyse a number of Xi’s statements and provide background information in order to 
clarify some of the statements for readers. They do not refute any of Xi’s statements.  
Regarding all the articles, most experts are from mainland China or from the US; only two 
experts are from Taiwan (Appendix 1.2). Some experts are mentioned multiple times. Usually the 
experts are quoted to support the argument of the writer or that of an official. None of the experts quoted 
refute an argument made by the author; instead the function of these experts is to substantiate an 
argument. There is no significant difference regarding the use of experts in the articles published prior 
to and after the phone call. Some titles contain terms such as ‘scholar(s)’ (学者) and ‘expert(s)’(专家), 
which already implies that experts will give their opinion. In my view, this aims to add even more 
credibility to the article.  
What I found notable was that some articles, mostly from the Global Times, used strong 
statements followed by an exclamation mark or a Chinese saying or poem as a closing sentence. 
Examples include ‘In the end, the DPP will always suffer from a close relationship with the U.S!’ (到
头来吃亏的永远是民进党当局 !)(GT07) and ‘Moving against the status quo will only lead to 
                                                 
18 This refers to the same speech as discussed in section 5.1.3 
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elimination in time’ (如果逆潮流而动，只会被时代所淘汰)(PD01). Expressions like these are most 
likely used to give the reader a feeling of ‘victory’ and to emphasise China’s strength and power. 
Statements like these also create a feeling of ‘us’ against ‘them’, which creates a sense of emotional 
attachment discussed in the literature review.  
Finally, the articles published after the phone call make more use of pictures. The articles 
published before the phone call only feature one picture. In the articles from the period after the phone 
call, a total 17 pictures were published. 11 of them in one article from the Global Times (GT08). These 
pictures included pictures of the members of the ‘Taiwan gang’ and their statements about China. In 
this article, the pictures added images of the ‘people’ who are ‘attacking’ China. Throughout this article, 
the pictures convey an aggressive tone, the frequent use of exclamation marks reinforces. Only one 
article contained a picture contains a picture of the author, or at least this is who the picture likely depicts 
(PD09). The purpose of this picture seemed to be to increase the seriousness and level of expertise in 
the article. The man in the picture, most likely the author, looks very formal, and this is likely aimed at 
gaining a reader’s trust.  
 
Examining the communication strategies described above can help to reveal how national identity is 
constructed by the two newspapers. According to the articles, China does have a ‘bottom line’, which is 
the One-China policy. However, it is not clear whether this line is crossed, touched or ignored. The 
discourse of China’s power is clearly visible in language features; both newspapers, before and after the 
phone call, use threatening language when referring to Taiwan and the US. Expressions placed at the 
end of the articles imply a feeling ‘victory’ and are likely aimed at creating a sense of ‘us’ against ‘them’. 
This creates emotional attachment and excludes Taiwan from China’s constructed identity. By contrast, 
when describing Taiwan, many articles claim that it is not an independent nation or state and that it 
belongs to mainland China. The language used throughout the articles also implies that China has 
experienced a ‘shift’ and, according to the two newspapers, is now moving to the centre of the global 
stage, having become the dominant power in cross-strait relations. This feeds into the discourse of 
China’s power. The notion of a ‘shift’ in reference to China’s power is, in my view, aimed at legitimis ing 
China’s claim on Taiwan. The articles suggest that China has earned this legitimacy from its experience 
throughout history.  
6 Limitations 
 
I want to briefly discuss the limitations of my research. First, we can never know exactly what is going 
on inside of the minds of journalists and of government officials of the PRC. Also, this research is 
limited to a total of 21 articles. Many more articles have been published, especially in the period before 
the phone call. In my thesis, I only consider two state-led newspapers. In order to gain a complete 
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overview of the discourse distributed by the PRC, it could be useful to examine other state-led media, 
such as television broadcasting, as well.  
As I discussed in my methodology section, a full discourse analysis is never possible. There are 
many hundreds of different levels, types, moves, dimensions, strategies, acts and other structures of 
discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2001, 98). While it is impossible to undertake a complete discourse 
analysis, I believe that the scope of my discourse analysis enables me to discover how Chinese national 
identity is constructed in the two state-led newspapers, the People’s Daily and the Global Times.   
 
7 Conclusion 
 
The research question I set out to answer in this thesis is: To what extent has the phone call from the 
president of the Republic Of China (ROC), Tsai Ing-wen, to the president–elect of the United States, 
Donald Trump, changed the discourse of the official Chinese state media on cross- strait relations and 
how does this relate to the construction of China’s national identity?   
The cross-strait issue is an interesting case study for examining national identity, since for China 
and Taiwan, identity is officially described in conflicting ways. The triangular relationship between 
China, Taiwan and the US is an important and complex issue for cross-strait relations. The One-China 
policy is an important framework in this triangular relationship. The phone call between the leader of 
the ROC and the president-elect of the US could have signalled a shift from the US to undermine the 
One-China policy, which could have major implications for cross-strait relations.  
Actors, like individuals, position themselves in relation to other states by adopting certain 
discourses and not others. The Trump-Tsai phone call constitutes a shift by actors other than China in 
the cross-strait issue, and my aim in this study was to find out if this relates to the construction of Chinese 
national identity. Studying discourse can thus provide an insight into how a national identity is 
constructed in relation to other actors.  
Based on the findings of my analysis I would suggest that there is a slight change in the discourse 
regarding cross-strait relations.  The articles published right after the phone call almost all write that ‘a 
small trick’ like this will not change anything in cross-strait relations. However, threatening language 
constructions used in relation to the US and Taiwan, the connotations of military and non-peaceful ways 
of unification and the confusion when it comes to the ‘bottom line’ suggest that this phone call was not 
expected by the PRC and that they do not know for sure what the outcomes will be. In the articles before 
the phone call, the US was seen as stable in its adherence to the One-China policy and in stabilizing 
cross-strait relations. Statements made by several journalists even suggested that the US will maybe 
even abandon the support for Taiwan in the future. After the phone call, the attitude of the U.S. towards 
cross-strait relations seemed to become unpredictable, which is mostly caused by the new president-
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elect, Trump. Due to this unpredictable move, China’s statement on ‘their’ national sovereignty and 
territory integrity have become more firm. 
The national identity of China, as it is constructed by these newspapers, is somewhat conflicted. 
On the one hand, they clearly state that Taiwan is part of China’s national sovereignty and territory and 
thus include Taiwan in Chinese national identity. On the other hand, language features differentiate 
Taiwan and the US as ‘others’. Expressions that suggest a sense of ‘victory’ and a feeling of ‘us’ against 
‘them’ are used as a way of excluding Taiwan from Chinese national identity. When speaking about 
Sino-U.S. relations, the newspaper include Taiwan in their national identity, whereas while speaking 
about the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, Taiwan is considered to be an external 
actor. The construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ also adds to the notion of emotional attachment, which is 
an essential part of national identity. This emotional attachment is underlined by linking China’s history 
of humiliation to the current claim on Taiwan.  
The ongoing power play with the US that is played out on the global stage is part of China’s 
identity. According to the two newspapers, due to China’s alleged ‘rise’ in recent years and its 
experiences throughout its history, it has become a strong and powerful, which has replaced the US in 
dominating cross-strait relations. Accordingly, China’s identity is considered ‘unassailable’ in the face 
of any changes in Sino-U.S. or cross-strait relations. This is emphasised even more after the phone call 
through mention of the PLA and their abilities. I believe this could be related to the legitimacy of the 
CCP in the PRC; any disturbance of people’s trust in the CCP could have major implications for their 
legitimacy as the only ruling party of the PRC.  
The international community plays a significant role in the construction China’s identity. The 
articles claim that the international community supports Taiwan’s status as being part of China. 
Furthermore, both newspapers argue that Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland is more important 
than any other relationship, even the one with the US. This establishes a notion of ‘dependence’ of 
Taiwan on the mainland, which builds on the identity construction of a strong and powerful China.  
The language used throughout the articles implies that China has gone through a ‘shift’ from a 
period of humiliation to becoming the strong power they it is today. I argue that this notion of a ‘shift’ 
aims to legitimise China’s claims on Taiwan and that the article in the period after the phone call even 
more emphasize this shift. In my view, this aims to reassure readers that China will one day achieve 
unification between the mainland and Taiwan, and that this phone call will not defer this goal. 
Unification of the mainland and Taiwan is thus entrenched in Chinese national identity.  
Analysing the discourse around an event that could possibly undermine the One-China policy 
has given us an insight into how these two Party papers construct a narrative of Chinese national identity.  
The term ‘One China, different interpretations’, is a confusing term, and this confusion is visible in the 
narrative which the two newspapers construct. The US plays a big role in how the identity of China and 
its relationship with Taiwan is constructed. The role of the US have become much more unpredictable 
due to this phone call and therefore I believe that the writers provide a reconfirmation of China’s so-
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called enormous power to their readers. I conclude that the articles construct an identity of China, which 
is ‘unassailable’ for any changes from external actors in Sino-U.S. or cross-strait relations. We can never 
know for sure what the journalists really had in mind while writing thesis articles, but in my view, the 
construction of China’s national identity in these newspapers could be part of the CCP’s long-term 
strategy. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Overview of Articles and Discourses 
 
Abbr. Date Newspaper Title Chinese Title English Discourse Topics 
 Tsai vs. Trump China’s 
Power 
Unification vs. 
Independence 
 Tsai Trump Uni. Ind. 
PD01 03-7-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
解决台湾问题，实现祖国统
一是中国共产党的历史使命 
专家解读习近平总书记“七
一”讲话 
Solving the Taiwan issue and realizing 
unification with the motherland, is the 
historical mission of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Experts interpret Xi Jinping's July 1 
speech 

   
PD02 27-7-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
学者关注两岸形势新变化 呼
吁台当局回应"九二共识" 
Scholars pay attention to the new changes in 
the situation across the Taiwan Strait and 
appeal to the Taiwan authorities to respond to 
the ‘92 consensus.
     
PD03 29-10-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
洪秀柱会晤 AIT 新主席：相
信美方也不乐见"台独 
Hong Xiuzhu meets with the new chairman of 
the AIT: “I believe the U.S .does not like to see 
Taiwan independence".
       
PD04 16-10-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
专家：如果两岸关系不好，
对于中美都不是好事 
Experts: If cross-strait relations are not 
developing well,  this is not a good thing for 
China and the U.S.
 

   
PD05 2-12-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
专家：台靠近美国只会成筹
码 美不会为其开战 
Experts: Taiwan will turn into a bargain chip 
when approaching the U.S., the U.S. will not go 
to war for them. 
    


PD06 4-12-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
台方小动作不可能改变台湾
是中国一部分的地位 
Taiwan's little trick cannot change status of 
Taiwan being a part of China.
       
PD07 5-12-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
特朗普就南海问题强硬表态 
拒谈南海相关政策 
Trump takes a firm position on the South China 
Sea dispute, he refuses to talk about related 
policies in the South China Sea.
    


PD08 5-12-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
小动作”改变不了中美大格局 A small trick will not change the large pattern 
in Sino-U.S. relations. 
       
PD09 6-12-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
以战略定力应对中美关系变
数（望海楼） 
Using  strategic force in order to answer to the 
changing relationship between the U.S. and 
China
      
PD10 7-12-
2016 
People's 
Dai ly 
特朗普与蔡英文通话是谁操
盘的？ 
Who is behind the phone call between Trump 
and Tsai Ing-wen?
      
GT01 1-8-
2016 
Global 
Times 
美“弃台论”再起：两岸关
系不佳台湾成“定时炸弹” 
The U.S. brings up the ‘abandoning Taiwan-
theory’ again: “Cross-strait relations are not 
good and Taiwan has become a ‘time bomb’”.
     
GT02 25-8-
2016 
Global 
Times 
陆学者：两岸关系和平稳定
不是靠喊出来的 “九二共
识”是最大现状 
Mainland scholar: “The peace and stability of 
Cross-Strait relations does not rely on shouting, 
the ‘92 consensus’ is the status quo”. 
     
GT03 3-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
社评：蔡英文特朗普通电话
与“一个中国” 
Trump-Tsai phone call and ‘One-China’.      
GT04 3-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
 王毅回应特朗普与蔡英文通
电话：台湾搞的小动作 
Wang Yi responds to the phone call between 
Trump and Tsai Ing-wen: “A small trick set up 
by Taiwan”. 
     
GT05 5-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
 特朗普团队回应与蔡英文通
电话：回答一个出于礼貌的
问候. 
Trump’s team responds to the phone call with 
Tsai Ing Wen: “We were answering a polite 
greeting”.  
     
GT06 5-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
 美当选副总统：特朗普出于
礼貌与蔡英文通话 对华政策
不变 
The U.S.’ vice president-elect: "Trumps call 
with Tsai Ing-wen was out of courtesy, the U.S.’ 
policy towards China will not change”. 
     
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GT07 5-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
蔚科：特朗普与蔡英文通电
话意味着什么 
Wei Ke: What the phone call between Trump 
and Tsai means. 
     
GT08 6-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
 警惕！特朗普身旁有个“台
湾帮”！ 
Be aware! Trump has a ‘Taiwan gang’ besides 
him!
     
GT09 6-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
特朗普幕僚妄谈“川蔡
门”:“不在乎羞辱中国，去
他们的” 
Trump's staff about the Trump-Tsai phone call: 
"We don't care about China, screw them". 
      
GT10 7-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
 特朗普蔡英文越过红线，难
道还要咱们陪个笑脸吗? 
Trump and Tsai Ing-wen cross the red line, do 
we need to keep on smiling?
     
GT11 12-12-
2016 
Global 
Times 
特朗普要挑战“一个中国”
政策？ 专家：他认识肤浅 
Trump to challenge the ‘One-China’ policy? 
Experts: “His knowledge is superficial”. 
     
 
 
Appendix 2: Overview of Experts 
 
Abbr. 
 
Reference 
title 
Experts 
in 
article  
Number  Name and function in article  
 
PD01 -  3 Yang Yizhou: Deputy head of the National Association of Taiwan Associations 
Ni Yongjie:  Executive deputy director of the Shanghai Taiwan Institute  
Liu Xiangping: Director of the Taiwan Research Institute of Nanjing University 
PD02 Scholars 
(学者 ) 
 8 Qi Jialin: Chairman of the China United National League 
Hu Lingwei: Deputy director of the Shanghai East Asia Institute 
Ji Xin: President of Taiwan’s ‘The Observer’ magazine 
Zheng Jian: Professor of the Collaborative Innovation Center for Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations 
Yin Cunyi: Executive vice president of the Taiwan Research Institute at Tsinghua University 
Cao Xiaoheng: Director of the Taiwan Economic Research Institute of Nankai University 
Yu Zhengsheng: Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
Yang Kaihuang: Director of Taiwan's Ming Chuan University Research Center 
PD03 -   - 
PD04 Expert(s) 
(专家 ) 
 4 Douglas Paal:  Former President of the AIT (American Institute for Taiwan affairs) and former U.S. National Security Council 
Asia security affairs director  
Evan Medeiros: Senior Director of Asian affairs for President Obama for the former National Security Council of the United 
States. 
Bonnie Glaser: Senior Advisor to the U.S. Center for International Strategic Studies (CSIS)  
J. Roy: Former U.S. ambassador to China, Assistant Secretary of State 
PD05 Expert(s) 
(专家 ) 
 3 McDevitt: Retired marine admiral from the U.S. 
Blair: Former National Intelligence Director of the U.S. 
Zhang Junshe: Researcher at the Chinese Naval Academy of Military Sciences 
PD06 - - - - 
PD07 - - - - 
PD08 - - - - 
PD09 -  1 Jia Xiudong (author): Special commentator and a distinguished researcher of the Chinese Institute of International Studies 
PD10 - - - - 
GT01 -  2 Ni Yongjie:  Executive deputy director of the Shanghai Taiwan Institute  
Chen Yixin: Professor of the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University 
GT02 Mainland 
Scholar(s): 
(陆学者) 
  Yang Ping: Researcher at the Taiwan Research Center in Jiangsu Province 
GT03 - - - - 
GT04 - - - - 
GT05 -  1 Liu Xiangping: Director of the Taiwan Research Institute of Nanjing University 
GT06 - - - Wei Ke (author): The author is an expert on Taiwan issues and a political commentator 
GT07 - - -  
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GT08 -  - Sun Yun: Senior researcher at the Washington think tank's Stimson Centre 
GT09 - - - - 
GT10    - 
GT11    Li Haidong: Professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Chinese Academy of Foreign Affairs,  
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Appendix 3.2: Articles from the Global Times 
 
 
Gao Xu. 1 August 2016. 美“弃台论”再起：两岸关系不佳台湾成“定时炸弹”. Global Times  
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      状. Global Times  
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Anonymous. 5 December 2016. 特朗普团队回应与蔡英文通电话：回答一个出于礼貌的问候. 
Global  
 Times  
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 Global Times  
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